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ABSTRACT 
Leaks in system piping used to transfer radioactive waste were 
attributed to water hammer. Valves leaked on several occasions and the 
cause of failure was not obvious. Facility records were used to 
determine the facility status at the time the leaks occurred. For one 
particular leak, valve manipulations controlling flow were shown to be 
coincident to the time of leak. The fluid transient pressures were 
calculated using TFSIM from the Tennessee Valley Authority. Once the 
maximum pressures were established, the stresses on the equipment 
could be discerned. Water hammer was concluded to be the failure 
mechanism. To eliminate this failure mechanism, procedural and 
equipment modifications were made and further leaks have been 
eliminated. 
 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
D  damping factor, psi 
∆h  change in enthalpy, BTU / pound 
∆s  change in entropy, BTU / pound·°R 
E  elastic modulus, psi  
ft  feet 
h  enthalpy, BTU / pound 
HDB4-6 diversion box 
i  dynamic amplification factor 
NPS national pipe schedule 
psi  pounds per square inch  
P, Peq pressure, psi  
PI  Process Information systems 
s  entropy, BTU / pound·°R 
SRS Savannah River Site 
St  static stress, psi 
T0  temperature, °R 
TFSIM Transient Fluid Simulation 
σ  dynamic stress, psi  
σe  fatigue limit, psi 
σra  range stress, psi 
ν  Poisson’s ratio 
ζ  damping ratio 
ζfl  fluid damping ratio 
ζs  structural damping ratio 
INTRODUCTION  
A recently developed dynamic stress theory (Leishear [1]) is applied 
here to evaluate valve failures in a piping system. In particular, valve 
leakage in a Savannah River Site (SRS) nuclear waste transfer system 
occurred during three separate incidents. In each incident, the waste was 
safely contained. However, a detailed analysis was performed to 
determine the failure cause. To perform the analysis, a description of 
the system, a description of the affected processes, and a fluid transient 
analysis are prerequisite to an evaluation of the stresses imposed on 
valves in the system and the implemented solutions to the problem. 
Essentially, a detailed description of the water hammer incidents and 
damages are followed by a pipe stress analysis and corrective actions. 
 
 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A system description is the basis for a system model, and the system 
in question consists of two connected piping systems: the flush water 
system and the transfer system. The flush water system provides water 
to flush, or rinse, the transfer piping after nuclear waste has been 
transported through the transfer piping. The flush water is connected to 
the transfer system through closed valves, which are opened to flush the 
transfer piping on completion of a transfer. There are numerous transfer 
lines and flush water systems at SRS, but this study was limited to one 
section of transfer piping and the flushes needed to effectively remove 
the waste from that transfer line. At the time the valves leaked, the 
transfer piping was operated in tandem with the flush water system. The 
focus of this paper is the relationship between valve failures and fluid 
transients, or pressure surges, induced by the flush water system which 
is described by the system description below.  
 
 
System Schematic 
A schematic of the combined transfer and flush water system is 
shown in Fig. 1. The facility layout and the pertinent flush water flow 
paths are shown in Fig. 2. Some added discussion clarifies the flush 
water system layout. The flow initiates within the 242-11H building at 
the flush water tank (Fig. 3), passes down through the flush water pump 
(Fig. 4), exits the building, and circles Tank 37, which is a nuclear 
waste storage tank. On the west side of Tank 37, the pipe tees off to 
Tank 37 in one direction. The piping continues to circle Tank 37 in the 
other direction to HDB6 and Tank 32. The underground transfer lines 
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connected between the diversion boxes and waste Tanks 32 and 37 are 
shown schematically in Fig. 5. Diversion boxes, like HDB6, are below 
grade concrete structures containing valves used to divert, or change, 
the flow path in the waste transfer piping system. HDB6 and HDB4 are 
shown in Figs. 6 and 7 respectively and are both shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: System Model / Schematic 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: System Layout 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Flush Water Tank 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Flush Water Pumps 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Schematic of Transfer Lines Between Tanks 32 and 
37 
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Figure 6: HDB6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: HDB4 
 
 
PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
There were three separate incidents of valve leakage in the transfer 
piping. During each incident several flow paths were used to flush the 
transfer lines. The various process flow paths are presented in Figs. 8 – 
11 and were extracted from Fig. 1. In each of these flow paths a single 
valve was suddenly opened while the pump was operating. This action 
induced water hammers, or fluid transients, of varying magnitudes 
throughout the system. Each of the figures shows all of the piping 
which was in service at the time when the successive water hammers 
occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Schematic for Flush Water Pump Operation  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Modeled Flow Path for Tank 37 Jet Flush 
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Figure 10: Modeled Flow Path for HDB6 Flush 
  
 
 
Figure 11: Modeled Flow Path for the HDB4 Flush 
RECORD OF VALVE LEAKAGE  
One of the valve leaks occurred at HDB4 and the system 
performance was recorded at the time that leak occurred. System 
records are kept in the facility using the Process Information System(PI 
[2]). The record of this incident is shown in Fig. 12. The figure is 
annotated to depict the times at which the various flushes were 
implemented. 
 
The legend in the lower left hand corner of the figure provides the 
key to observe the flush tank level. EVP FLW TANK LEVEL indicates 
the level in the tank as the flushes are performed. The tank level varies 
between 25 and 45 inches, where the tank level is recorded on the right 
hand side of the graph. Note that the flush tank level varies rapidly 
between the points indicated as points 2 – 11 on the graph. At these 
times, flushes are being performed and the tank is being continually 
emptied and refilled. 
 
The sump level indicates the actual occurrence of the leak. As the 
valve leaked into the diversion box (HDB4), a depression in the floor of 
the diversion box, called a sump, collected the leaked waste, and the 
level in the sump was recorded. This level is shown in Fig. 12 and can 
be seen to vary between 2 and 10 inches. The magnitude of the level is 
discerned from the scale at the right side of the graph. The leak started 
at point 2 shown on the graph when one of the water hammers damaged 
the valve. At point 12 on the graph, the valves were hammered again 
and the leak rate increased. At point 13, the sump was emptied using a 
remotely operated jet eductor pump, which is installed in the sump. The 
time scale on the bottom of the graph shows that the entire incident 
occurred in less than one hour. The size of the leak during this time was 
approximately seven gallons. The leaking nuclear waste was completely 
contained within the diversion box. In short, leaks were coincident to 
valve manipulations. The relationship of these valve manipulations to 
water hammer are considered next. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Documentation of HDB4 Leak Using PI 
 
 
WATER HAMMER CALCULATIONS  
The magnitudes of the pressure transients were calculated using 
TFSIM (Schohl [3])and the model shown in Fig. 1.The details of the 
fluid flow analysis are available and the results of those calculations are 
considered to be accurate to within 10 to 30 percent (Leishear [4]). 
Those calculations are summarized by redrawing Fig. 12 as Fig. 13 and 
annotating the graph with TFSIM results. The figure shows the various 
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surges which occurred during each of the three leaks. Note that the 
pressure surges varied from 300 to 524 psi. Having determined the 
system pressures, the failure mechanism of the valve was considered. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Summary of Transient Pressures Causing Leaks 
 
 
VALVE FAILURE MECHANISM  
The valve leaked around the valve stem as shown in Fig. 14. This 
figure provides a photograph of the valve leakage and an enlargement 
of that photograph. The stem connects the ball inside the valve to the 
handle mounted above the diversion box shown in Fig. 7. The valves 
are rated to 760 psi and one valve was hydrostatically tested to 1000 psi 
as shown in Fig. 15. The pressure was slowly applied in the hydrostatic 
test. However, the applied pressures of 300 – 524 psi during the water 
hammers were suddenly applied, and dynamic effects must therefore be 
considered since the applied pressures are below the rated pressures of 
the valve. 
 
 
Figure 14: Photographs of Transfer Valve Packing Leak  
 
 
Figure 15: Hydrostatic Test of a Valve Identical to the 
Leaking Valve 
 
 
DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF THE APPLIED PRESSURE 
The dynamic effects of a suddenly applied pressure are available in 
earlier work (Leishear [1]). All of the equations used below in this 
dynamic analysis were presented and discussed in detail in this earlier 
work. The dynamic stress, σ, was shown to be a function of the static 
stress due to a gradually applied load, St, Poisson’s ratio, ν, and a 
dynamic amplification factor, i. For a short length of pipe the maximum 
hoop stress equals 
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    St2Sti ⋅<⋅=σ           (1) 
 
For a long length of pipe, the hoop stress equals 
 
St)23(Sti ⋅ν+<⋅=σ           (2) 
 
Substitution of Eq. 1 into Eq. 2 yields 
 
             St)23(St)2
2
i3( ⋅ν+<⋅ν+⋅=σ           (3) 
 
 
This equation can be used to find the hoop stress in a long length of 
continuous pipe, but how can this equation be applied to a valve, which 
does not have a cylindrical shape? Equation 1 is applicable to any shape 
and can be directly applied by using an equivalent pressure Peq. Since 
the static and dynamic stresses are proportional to the applied pressure, 
P. 
 
       PieqPP)
2
2
i3( ⋅≥≥⋅ν+⋅           (4) 
 
Peq is greater than or equal to i · P since it lies somewhere between the 
values prescribed by Eqs. 1 and 3. The exact values of Peq can only be 
found for a valve on a case by case basis using finite element 
techniques. Having obtained Eq. 4, the value of i needed to be 
determined to complete a failure analysis of the valve. 
 
 
Dynamic Analysis of the Failure 
 The pressures shown in Fig. 13 were approximated in this analysis 
by a single step pressure increase of 524 psi. This approximation 
provides a bounding upper limit to this analysis. The equivalent 
pressure equals 
 
                
iP
21
e1PeqP ⋅=
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
ζ−
π⋅ζ−
+⋅=
          (5) 
 
 
The damping coefficient for a vibrating system, ζ, is found from the 
fluid damping, ζfl, and the structural damping, ζS.  
 
 
Fluid damping. The fluid damping has the greatest effect on the 
pipe stress solutions. The second law of thermodynamics and the 
vibration equations can be combined to find a minimum damping 
coefficient due to fluid damping. Figs. 16 and 17 facilitate discussion of 
this concept.  
 
 
Figure 16: Dynamic Amplification Factor 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Relationship Between Dynamic Amplification 
Factor and Thermodynamic Efficiency 
 
The percent overshoot, PO, is the percentage of increase above the 
static stress that occurs when a step pressure is exerted on the pipe wall, 
and can be expressed as 
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In the absence of damping, the PO equals one. Simply adding this value 
to one gives the dynamic amplification factor for the SDOF model, 
which typically varies between one and two. 
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The Second Law thermodynamic efficiency may be defined as the 
maximum work that can be obtained from a system. For a compression 
cycle, the efficiency equals 
 
  
h
s0Th
∆
∆⋅−∆=ε            (9) 
 
where ∆h is the change in enthalpy or ideal work of the process, ∆s is 
the change in entropy, and T0 is the ambient temperature. The 
thermodynamic properties are obtained at the initial or dead state, and 
the final, or equilibrium state. Assuming the fluid properties to vary 
linearly, and considering only fluid damping, the maximum achievable 
stress must, of necessity, be governed by this Second Law relationship. 
In that case, the maximum stress equals 
 
  StiSt2max ⋅=⋅⋅ε=σ⋅ε=σ         (10) 
 
and the dynamic amplification factor, i, is expressed by 
  
     2 · ε = i         (11) 
 
Using Eq. 7 and 10, the fluid damping can be determined. There may be 
other losses associated with cavitation at the pipe wall / fluid interface, 
but, at a minimum, this fluid damping coefficient should be considered. 
Once the fluid damping coefficient is established, the lesser structural 
damping coefficient can be considered.  
 
Equating the dynamic amplification factor to one half of the 
thermodynamic efficiency, ε, the damping coefficient, ζ, can be found. 
The values for the entropy, s, and enthalpy, h, are first required for this 
comparison. The dead state is 14.7 psi, and the equilibrium state occurs 
at the median pressure, 524 + 14.7 ≈ 539  psi. The required values of 
the enthalpy, h, and the entropy, s, are found in the steam tables 
(Keenan, et. al. [5]), using linear interpolation. T0 is the ambient 
temperature. 
 
 
 
The efficiency then equals 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 932.
)06.3852.39(
07348.007331.07045906.3851.39 =−
−⋅++−=ε  
             (12) 
 
 
Pressure 
psi 
0 14.7 500 564 1000 
Temp.  
°F 
h, from  
steam  
table 
∆h 
BTU/ 
(pound) 
h, from  
steam  
table 
∆h 
BTU/ 
(pound) 
h, from 
steam  
table 
50 18.06  19.50  20.94 
70  38.06 39.44 39.55 40.84 
100 68.05  69.36  70.68 
 s, from  
steam  
table 
∆s 
BTU/ 
(pound°R) 
s, from  
steam  
table 
∆s 
BTU/ 
(pound°R) 
s, from 
steam  
table 
50 -.03607  0.03599  0.03592
70 0.07349 0.07348 0.07332 0.07329 0.07316
100 0.12963  0.12932  0.12901
 
Table 2: Calculation of Enthalpy and Entropy 
 
 
Substitution of Eq. 11 into Eq. 8, and Solving for ζfl, yields 
 
  ( )( )( )( ) 066.0221932.0ln
21932.0ln2
fl =π+−
−⋅=ζ        (13)
   
 
Having obtained the fluid damping factor, the effects of structural 
damping were also considered.  
 
Structural damping. The structural damping coefficient, ζS, was 
calculated using Lazan’s [6] approximation for the damping ratio (Eq. 
11) was based on a number cycles equal to 2 · 107 cycles. For this 
number of cycles, the value for the endurance strength, or fatigue limit, 
of TP304L stainless steel is 24,300 psi. the fatigue strength is 
extrapolated from the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sect. 
III, Table I-9.2.2, Curve A.  Then,  
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where D is a material property known as the damping factor, and E is 
the Modulus of Elasticity. 
 
 
Total damping. This 0.52 % damping value is in the range of the 
value of 2 % required for ASME B31.3 piping which has a diameter 
less than 12 inches. The ASME values are used for the structural 
response of piping during earthquakes. The value of ζS, equal to 0.5 % 
value was used in this calculation. Assuming the principle of 
superposition, the damping coefficients are added to obtain 
 
  071.0005.0066.0Sfl =+=ζ+ζ≅ζ           (17) 
 
 
Damping factor and equivalent pressure. Although a trial 
and error solution could be used to refine the value of the damping 
coefficient, a reasonable approximation of the equivalent pressure is 
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The dynamic amplification factor is then  
 
            i = 1.8         (19) 
  
This value of i is applicable to the case where the maximum pressure in 
the pipe was found to be 524 psi. Since this was the largest pressure 
calculated in this analysis, and i is proportional to stress, values of i for 
lower pressures will be less than this value. That is, i < 1.8. The 
equivalent pressure of 943 psi is beyond the design limit of 760 psi for 
the valves, and as noted above, the effects of the pressure may be even 
greater than the 943 psi value. 
 
 
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 
Facility procedures and equipment were modified and further 
damage was eliminated. Immediate changes were made to procedures 
and personnel training to control transients in this system. A slow 
operating valve was also installed to eliminate significant transients. 
TFSIM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the slow acting valve. 
Figure 8 and Fig. 18 describe the same water hammer event. The only 
difference between the two figures is that Fig. 18 has been simplified 
and annotated with TFSIM results. Figure 19 provides the TFSIM 
results for this same configuration where the transient is controlled with 
a ball valve having a ten second linear closure time. A comparison of 
Figs. 18 and 19 shows that the transients are very well controlled using 
this technique. Other transients were controlled procedurally. 
 
 
Figure 18: Pressure increase when Valve 1073 is Suddenly 
Closed 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Pressure Increase when a Linear Actuated Ball 
Valve is used to Control Fluid Transients 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Did the valve leaks result from water hammer?  The facts indicate 
yes. Three separate leaks occurred during flushing operations. The third 
leak is well documented. The initial leak occurred when valves were 
operated, several hundred feet away. This paper quantifies a pressure 
surge occurred, which occurred when the valves were operated, and 
proves that water hammer was the initiating event for the failure. More 
importantly, the use of a dynamic amplification factor was used to 
investigate pipe failures due to a suddenly applied load caused by water 
hammer. The most complex part of a water hammer analysis is the fluid 
transient analysis. The pipe stresses or equivalent pressures in a piping 
system can be reasonably approximated using recently published closed 
form solutions.  
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